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Abstract	
In	 1990,	 the	 World	 Health	 Organization	 (WHO)	 started	 to	 downsize	 its	 renowned	 Global	
Programme	on	AIDS,	despite	continued	donor	and	member	state	support.	This	turnaround	has	
decisively	contributed	to	WHO’s	loss	of	leadership	in	HIV/AIDS	politics.	From	the	viewpoint	of	
both	 rationalist	 and	 constructivist	 theories	 of	 IO	 (international	 organisation’s)	 agency,	 an	 IO	
engaging	 in	 ‘mission	 shrink’	 is	 a	 striking	 irregularity.	 In	order	 to	account	 for	 such	apparently	
self-defeating	 behaviour,	 this	 article	 adopts	 an	 open	 systems	 view	 of	 international	
organisations	and	identifies	trans-organisational	coalitions	as	important	agents	of	IO	change.	I	
argue	that	subunit	dynamics	rather	than	systemic	conditions	drive	IO	behaviour,	in	particular	
where	member	states’	material	power	and	their	formal	control	of	organisational	veto	positions	
do	not	coincide.	This	approach	will	be	used	to	retrace	the	changes	 in	subunit	coalitions	 that	
drove	WHO’s	 erratic	 HIV/AIDS	 programme	 and	 thus	 to	 solve	 this	 puzzle	 of	 ‘mission	 shrink’.	
Based	on	 insights	 from	 the	WHO	case,	 the	article	 concludes	by	offering	a	heuristic	of	 trans-
organisational	coalitions	and	the	types	of	IO	change	associated	with	them.	
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Introduction	
When	AIDS	emerged	as	a	devastating	new	disease	in	the	1980s,	WHO	initially	took	the	lead	in	
accordance	 with	 its	 mandate	 to	 ‘act	 as	 the	 directing	 and	 co-ordinating	 authority	 on	
international	 health	work’	 (WHO	 2006:	 2).	 Its	Global	 Programme	 on	 AIDS	 (GPA),	 created	 in	
1987,	 defied	 all	 suspicions	 about	 inertia	 in	 UN	 bureaucracies.	 GPA	 prided	 itself	 on	 its	
innovative	 and	 multidisciplinary	 approach	 in	 the	 fight	 against	 HIV/AIDS	 that	 became	 the	
standard	 for	 the	 public	 health	 community.	 It	 won	 unmatched	 donor	 support	 as	 well	 as	
collaboration	 by	 civil	 society	 and	 development	 organisations,	 and	 WHO	 was	 officially	
recognised	as	the	leading	agency	in	the	UN	response	to	HIV/AIDS	(Jönsson	1996).	Yet	in	1990,	
at	 the	height	of	 its	 activities,	GPA	started	 to	 contract	and	massively	downsized	 its	activities.	
Donor	and	member	state	support	had	not	waned,	GPA’s	mandate	remained	unchanged,	and	
	AIDS	 was	 far	 from	 being	 under	 control.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 external	 constraints	 on	 further	
expansion,	what	moved	WHO	to	give	up	momentum	for	 leadership	in	international	HIV/AIDS	
politics?	Given	 that	 IOs	 are	 renowned	 for	maintaining	 even	dysfunctional	 programmes,	why	
would	WHO	step	back	from	one	of	its	most	successful	programmes	that	powerfully	underlined	
its	 constitutional	 leadership	 in	 international	health	governance?	This	puzzling	move	critically	
damaged	 WHO’s	 position	 in	 the	 global	 HIV/AIDS	 field,	 and	 indeed	 within	 GPA’s	 successor	
organisation,	UNAIDS.	
Existing	 approaches	 to	 IO	 behaviour	 have	 difficulty	 in	 accounting	 for	 ‘mission	 shrink’	 in	
international	 organisations.	 In	 fact,	 established	 rationalist	 and	 constructivist	 models	 of	 IOs,	
though	disagreeing	on	the	logic	of	IO	agency,	assume	that	IO	bureaucracies	can	be	understood	
as	 coherent	 actors	with	 expansionary	 tendencies.	 Principal-agent	 theory’s	 opportunistic	 and	
self-serving	 agents	 are	 challenged	by	 constructivism’s	 rule-driven	bureaucracies,	 but	 in	 both	
versions	bureaucratic	agents	strive	to	broaden	their	mandate	and	impose	their	policies	as	far	
as	 possible	within	 given	 constraints.	 Given	 that	 such	 constraints	were	 not	 given	 in	 the	GPA	
case,	it	makes	sense	to	suspend	the	actor	assumption	and	look	to	subunit	dynamics	instead.	
This	 article	 thus	 starts	 from	 the	 puzzle	 of	 GPA’s	 sudden	 decline	 to	 theorise	 how	 subunit	
dynamics	 impact	 on	 IO	 change	 and	 produce	 organisational	 outcomes	 that	 can	 hardly	 be	
accounted	 for	 in	 corporate	 terms.	 In	 fact,	 if	WHO	was	a	 coherent	 actor,	 its	 response	 to	 the	
HIV/AIDS	 crisis	 would	 raise	 suspicions	 of	 schizophrenia.	 Enthusiastic	 beginnings,	 a	 sudden	
withdrawal,	 and	 ultimately	 vain	 and	 unrealistic	 claims	 to	 leadership	 in	 UNAIDS,	 point	 to	
internal	 contradictions	 and	 conflicts.	 To	 account	 for	 such	 conflicts	 and	 the	 types	 of	 change	
associated	with	 them,	 this	 article	 conceptualises	 IOs	 as	 ‘open	 systems’	 that	 are	 constituted	
through	 decentralised	 transactions	at	 rather	 than	 decision	within	 organisational	 boundaries	
(Ansell	 and	 Weber	 1999;	 Scott	 2003).	 Drawing	 mainly	 on	 sociological	 organisation	 theory	
3	
	
(Friedberg	1997;	 Pfeffer	 and	 Salancik	 2003),	 I	 focus	on	 trans-organisational	 coalitions	 as	 the	
basic	 units	 of	 analysis.	 Transcending	 organisational	 boundaries,	 these	 coalitions	 sustain	 IO-
environment	transactions	at	the	subunit	level	and	pursue	goals	that	may	well	be	in	conflict	or	
incompatible	 with	 each	 other.	 They	 constitute	 ‘local	 orders’	 (Friedberg	 1997)	 beneath	 the	
corporate	level,	meaning	that	they	are	not	mere	reflections	of	the	whole,	but	to	some	degree	
independent	 centres	 of	 organisational	 agency.i	 Such	 local	 factors,	 I	 will	 argue,	 become	
consequential	 where	member	 states’	 ‘external’,	material	 power	 and	 their	 control	 of	 formal	
power	 position	 inside	 IOs	 diverge.	 Different	 coalitions	 with	 different	 sources	 of	material	 or	
organisational	 (veto)	 power	 can	 thus	 block	 each	 other	 or	 initiate	 change	 beneath	 the	
corporate	level.	
I	 will	 use	 this	 approach	 to	 explain	 GPA’s	 puzzling	 contraction	 as	 an	 outcome	 of	 shifting	
coalitions	within	WHO.	The	processes	in	and	around	GPA	will	be	reconstructed	with	the	help	of	
organisational	publications	and	secondary	sources	that	document	GPA’s	history	and	the	power	
struggles	 that	 led	 to	 its	 demise.	 The	 implications	 of	 this	 explanation	 go	 beyond	 explaining	
exceptional	cases	of	‘mission	shrink’,	though.	Quite	the	contrary,	WHO’s	increasing	reliance	on	
project-specific	contracts	funded	by	extra-budgetary	sources	highlights	that	the	fragmentation	
of	agency	is	a	more	widespread	phenomenon	and	can	be	a	driving	force	behind	mission	creep	
as	 well.	 Drawing	 on	 these	 insights,	 I	 will	 put	 forward	 a	 heuristic	 of	 coalition	 types	 and	 the	
modes	of	change	associated	with	them	as	a	basis	for	further	research.	
The	article	is	divided	into	four	main	parts.	The	first	section	introduces	the	history	of	the	GPA	
and	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 puzzling	 for	 both	 rationalist	 and	 constructivist	 explanations	 of	 IO	
behaviour.	Secondly,	the	trans-organisational	approach	to	IO	change	will	be	introduced	as	an	
alternative	 to	 theories	 of	 IO	 agency.	 Thirdly,	 I	 will	 analyse	 the	 GPA	 case	 through	 the	 local	
orders	lens.	Finally,	the	paper	takes	an	inductive	step	and	points	out	the	broader	implications	
	of	 the	 coalitional	 approach	 to	 explaining	 IO	 change.	 The	 paper	 concludes	 by	 gesturing	 to	
further	empirical	questions	that	follow	from	its	main	arguments.		
A	cautionary	note	about	the	empirical	scope	of	this	article	is	in	order.	The	article	does	not	aim	
to	 explain	 the	 creation	 of	 UNAIDS	 as	 the	 sole	 result	 of	 internal	 conflicts	 in	 WHO.	 Any	
monocausal	 explanation	 of	 this	 organisational	 innovation	 would	 be	 skewed	 (Soni	 1998).	
Although	 the	 trans-organisational	 perspective	 may	 in	 principle	 be	 extended	 to	 entire	
organisational	fields	(see	Jönsson	1986)	and	may	also	shed	light	on	the	interagency	struggles	
that	preceded	the	creation	of	UNAIDS	(see	Jönsson	1996;	Knight	2008),	the	article	focuses	on	
the	WHO	side	of	the	story.	 Its	aim	is	to	uncover	the	systematic	frictions	 in	a	UN	agency	torn	
between	donor	and	member	state	control	and	to	identify	constellations	that	are	likely	to	occur	
in	other	organisations	as	well.	It	thereby	contributes	conceptual	building	blocks	for	theorising	
IO	change	beyond	the	principal-agent	divide.	
	
	
The	rise	and	decline	of	WHO’s	Global	Programme	on	AIDS	
In	the	early	1980s,	the	health	community	was	shaken	up	by	a	new	and	unknown	disease	that	
was	 eventually	 identified	 as	 HIV	 by	 1984.	 This	 deadly	 condition	was	 first	 discovered	 among	
young	homosexual	men	in	the	US,	and	it	soon	became	clear	that	it	was	spread	through	sexual	
intercourse.	While	the	disease	was	first	perceived	to	be	confined	to	local	outbreaks	in	the	US,	
Europe	 and	 Haiti,	 by	 1985	 the	 global	 scope	 of	 AIDS	was	 hardly	 disputed	 (Knight	 2008:	 13).	
Many	African	countries	were	severely	struck	by	the	disease,	and	the	looming	further	spread	of	
the	virus	alarmed	both	specialists	and	the	wider	public	(Soni	1998:	21-25).		
The	origins	of	AIDS	 in	 the	homosexual	community	and	among	 injecting	drug	users	made	the	
disease	a	highly	politicised	health	 issue.	While	conservative	 forces	 in	 the	west	were	strongly	
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opposed	 to	 scaling	up	HIV/AIDS	 research,	western	AIDS	 research	 in	Africa	was	 charged	with	
colonialism.	 Uncertainty,	 prejudice	 and	 stigmatisation	 pervaded	 not	 only	 public,	 but	 also	
scientific	debates.	In	this	climate	of	urgency	and	political	contestation,	states	turned	to	WHO	
as	 an	 impartial	 ‘clearing-house’	 (Garrett	 1995:	 359)	 through	 which	 they	 could	 channel	 and	
coordinate	international	activities	in	HIV/AIDS	research	and	policy.		
Thus	 in	 1987,	 following	 a	 World	 Health	 Assembly	 (i.e.	 member	 state)	 request	 that	 WHO	
explore	ways	 in	which	 it	 could	 assist	member	 states	 in	 dealing	with	 the	 new	disease,	WHO	
established	 the	 Special	 Programme	 on	 AIDS	 (SPA,	 renamed	 Global	 Programme	 on	 AIDS	 in	
1988).	WHO,	an	experienced	health	development	agency,	should	facilitate	scientific	exchange	
and	 find	 means	 to	 combat	 the	 spread	 of	 HIV	 (Soni	 1998:	 26).	 SPA/GPA,	 which	 was	 placed	
directly	under	 the	authority	of	 the	Director-General,	was	 supplied	with	 large	extrabudgetary	
donations	by	wealthy	member	states.	Between	1987	and	1990,	contributions	rose	from	annual	
US$30	 million	 to	 US$90	 million	 (Knight,	 2008:	 16),	 and	 GPA	 grew	 into	 the	 largest	 single	
programme	 in	WHO	 (Merson	et	 al.	 2008:	 480-481)	 employing	400	 individuals	 by	 1990	 (Soni	
1998:	34).	Its	comprehensive	approach	to	HIV/AIDS	–	ranging	from	sex	education	and	condom	
promotion	to	efforts	to	improve	blood	safety	–	became	‘axiomatic’	(Leaning	1998:	754)	in	the	
health	 community.	 Furthermore,	 through	 its	 cooperation	 with	 the	 United	 Nations	
Development	 Programme	 (UNDP),	 GPA	 was	 able	 to	 provide	 not	 only	 technical,	 but	 also	
financial	support	to	developing	countries	(Chin,	2007:	200-202).	
The	programme	became	prominent	beyond	WHO	and	the	public	health	community,	too.	GPA	
leader	Jonathan	Mann	was	invited	to	speak	before	the	UN	General	Assembly	as	early	as	1987	
(Garrett,	1995:	465).	The	result	was	a	resolution	commending	the	work	of	WHO	and	affirming	
WHO’s	leadership	in	international	AIDS	politics	(United	Nations	General	Assembly,	1987).	GPA	
collaborated	with	 other	UN	 organisations	 such	 as	UNICEF,	 the	UN	 Population	 Fund	 and	 the	
	International	Labour	Organization,	and	with	non-governmental	organisations	and	human	rights	
groups.	 The	 trust	 that	 donorsii	 had	 in	 the	 programme	 was	 not	 only	 expressed	 in	 rising	
contributions,	but	also	by	the	fact	that	their	contributions	were	unspecified,	leaving	decisions	
about	their	specific	usage	to	GPA	leaders	(Soni	1998:	61;	see	Mann	and	Kay	1991:	S223).		
Yet,	despite	continued	external	support	and	an	unaltered	mandate,	WHO	started	to	massively	
downsize	 its	 HIV/AIDS	 activities	 from	 1990	 onwards.	 GPA’s	 role	 was	 reinterpreted	 as	 a	
technical	rather	than	multisectoral	programme.	Its	activities	were	concentrated	on	treatment	
and	medical	research,	while	the	social	and	behavioural	components	of	the	pandemic	as	well	as	
GPA’s	previous	human	rights	agenda	became	marginalised.	Furthermore,	GPA’s	coordinating	
function	was	interpreted	much	more	restrictively.	Collaboration	with	civil	society	organisations	
was	 scaled	down	 to	purely	 financial	 transfers,	while	outreach	 to	 communal	 partners	 ceased	
being	 a	 priority.	 Personnel	 experienced	 in	 the	 field	 of	 HIV/AIDS	 were	 moved	 out	 of	 the	
programme	 and	 replaced	 by	 staff	 with	 internal	 bureaucratic	 credentials	 (Soni	 1998:	 90-97).	
Hence,	 GPA’s	 autonomy	 was	 significantly	 curbed	 and	 its	 programme	 reoriented	 toward	 its	
medical	core.		
This	shift	had	not	been	asked	for	by	GPA’s	donors.	It	consequently	provoked	not	only	a	crisis	of	
confidence,	but	also	a	decline	in	donations	to	GPA	beginning	in	1991	(Knight	2008:	18).	Thus,	
1990	 was	 a	 major	 turning	 point	 for	 WHO’s	 role	 in	 HIV/AIDS	 politics.iii 	 The	 organisation	
interrupted	the	expansion	of	 its	 flagship	programme	and	reinterpreted	 its	 role	 from	a	global	
policy	 leader	 to	 a	 technical,	 medical	 agency.	 When	 UNAIDS	 was	 created	 in	 1995,	 WHO	
belatedly	 attempted	 to	 reclaim	 UN-wide	 leadership	 (Knight,	 2008:	 28).	 However,	 it	 only	
became	 one	 of	 six	 co-sponsoring	 agencies	 which	 had	 a	 seat,	 but	 no	 vote,	 at	 UNAIDS’	
Programme	 Coordinating	 Board.iv	 GPA	 was	 dismantled	 and	 its	 staff	 partially	 transferred	 to	
UNAIDS,	so	that	in	the	late	1990s	the	number	of	full-time	HIV/AIDS	professionals	at	WHO	went	
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down	to	three	(Gerbase	et	al.	2009:	8).	Following	this	transfer,	it	took	the	organisation	nearly	a	
decade	to	rebuild	capacity	in	this	priority	field	of	international	health	work.v	
Established	 approaches	 to	 IO	 change	 have	 difficulty	 in	 accounting	 for	 this	 turnaround.	 Both	
rationalists	and	constructivists	assume	that	IOs	have	a	tendency	for	‘mission	creep’	rather	than	
self-restraint.	First,	 the	 rationalist	principal-agent	 (PA)	approach	suggests	 that	 self-serving	 IO	
‘agents’	 continuously	 strive	 to	expand	 their	budget	 and	mandate,	 exploiting	 their	principals’	
uncertainty	as	to	whether	budget	increases	are	necessary	and	efficient	or	not	(Niskanen	1994).	
This	form	of	agency	slack	is,	from	a	PA	perspective,	one	of	the	greatest	risks	states	face	when	
delegating	authority	to	international	organisations	(see	Copelovitch	2010:	54,	57)	and	part	of	
the	 explanation	 why	 international	 organisations	 ‘never	 die’	 (Strange	 1998).	 To	 contain	 the	
expansionary	 tendencies	 of	 their	 agents,	 states	 can	 deploy	 budgetary	 constraints	 or	
circumscribe	the	IO’s	mandates	(see	Nielson	and	Tierney	2003:	242;	Hawkins	et	al.	2006:	30).	
However,	such	limitations	were	not	present	In	the	GPA	case	when	the	programme	started	to	
contract	 in	 1990.	Donors	 and	member	 state	 principals	 did	 not	 change	GPA’s	mandate	 (Soni	
1998:	 93),	 resource	 supply	 was	 abundant,	 and	 AIDS	 continued	 to	 spread	 while	 knowledge	
about	the	disease	continued	to	grow	(Mann	et	al.,	1992).	Thus,	the	conditions	highlighted	by	
the	PA	approach	can	hardly	account	for	GPA’s	sudden	change	of	course.	
Secondly,	 the	 constructivist	 ‘bureaucratic	 culture’	 model	 of	 IOs	 comes	 up	 with	 similar	
behavioural	 predictions,	 even	 though	 it	 is	 grounded	 in	 a	 different	 conceptualisation	 of	 IO	
agency.	Understood	 as	 rule-driven	 and	 self-referential	Weberian	 bureaucracies	 (Barnett	 and	
Finnemore	 2004),	 international	 organisations	 are	 eager	 to	 apply	 their	 established	
competencies,	and	approach	their	environment	 in	terms	of	the	solutions	they	are	capable	of	
providing	 (March	 and	Olsen	 1998:	 966-968).	 This	 capacity-driven	 behaviour	 is	 backed	 up	 by	
supranational	 bureaucrats’	 cognitive	 inclination	 to	 see	 the	world	 as	 demanding	more	 rather	
	than	 less	 bureaucratic	 intervention:	 Bureaucrats	 craft	 policies	 based	 on	 rational	 and	 rule-
governed	 approaches,	 the	 natural	 provider	 of	 which	 are	 bureaucracies	 themselves	 (Barnett	
and	 Finnemore	 2004:	 43).	 Even	 organisational	 failures	 are	 not	 interpreted	 as	 reasons	 for	
withdrawal	 or	 restraint,	 rather	 for	 renewed	 and	 enlarged	 IO	 programmes	 (Barnett	 and	
Finnemore	2004:	44).	Only	where	there	 is	a	clear	mismatch	between	an	 IO’s	 internal	culture	
and	external	policy	demands	may	an	IO	seek	to	avoid	or	even	defy	such	demands	in	order	to	
preserve	 its	 identity	 and	 autonomy	 (Barnett	 and	Coleman	2005:	 601-602).	 This	was	 not	 the	
case	for	GPA,	though.	The	programme’s	and	donors’	policy	goals	were	sufficiently	aligned	to	
prevent	such	a	conflict,	and	the	fact	that	 it	was	funded	by	unspecified	contributions	allowed	
GPA	to	work	quite	autonomously.	
Indeed,	 recent	constructivist	contributions	have	questioned	the	static	nature	of	bureaucratic	
identities	and	emphasised	that	internal	debate	and	belief	change	among	bureaucrats	can	alter	
IO	 policies	 (Leiteritz	 2005;	 Chwieroth	 2008,	 2009;	 see	 Park	 and	 Vetterlein	 2010).	 However,	
there	 is	no	evidence	for	such	contestation	and	belief	change	among	GPA’s	protagonists	who	
are	 reported	 to	 have	 formed	 a	 cohesive	 group	 of	 committed	 individuals	 behind	 Jonathan	
Mann	(Chin	2007:	200-202).	Rather,	as	the	case	study	beneath	will	show,	it	was	a	major	shift	in	
organisational	 coalitions	 –	 and	 thus	 in	 the	 protagonists	 themselves	 –	 that	 caused	 GPA	 to	
reverse	 course.	 Before	we	will	 turn	 to	 this	 case	 study,	 the	 following	 section	 introduces	 the	
open	systems	view	of	IO	change	on	which	it	is	based.					
	
	
Local	orders	in	international	organisations	
That	 rationalist	 and	 constructivist	 predictions	 for	 IO	 behaviour	 significantly	 overlap	 is	 only	
surprising	at	first	glance.	In	fact,	both	approaches	start	from	the	assumption	that	there	is	some	
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corporate	 interest	 that	 the	 organisation	 seeks	 to	 preserve	 collectively.	 International	
organisations	are	conceived	of	as	corporate	actors	with	a	genuine	interest	in	self-maintenance	
and	 internally	 defined	 goals.	 Such	 a	 view	 suggests	 that	 decision	 making	 in	 IOs	 is	 either	
determined	by	a	 ‘dominant’	organisational	culture	(e.g.	Weaver	2008:	73)	or	the	outcome	of	
an	 internal	 dispute	 where	 the	 parties	 ultimately	 settle	 on	 the	 position	 that	 is	 in	 the	
organisation’s	best	interest	(Barnett	and	Coleman	2005:	601).	Accordingly,	much	of	the	debate	
about	 IO	 agency	 has	 been	 concerned	 with	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 external	 or	 internal	
determinants	 are	 more	 consequential	 for	 IO	 change,	 and	 how	 these	 determinants	 are	
balanced	(Barnett	and	Coleman	2005;	Freitas	2004).		
Implicit	 in	 such	 an	 approach	 is	 the	 assumption	 that	 IO	 boundaries	 pose	 clear	 limits	 to	
organising	agency.	A	self-organised	bureaucracy	is	opposed	to	a	collectivity	of	principals	who	
jointly	govern	their	agent	once	collective	action	problems	have	been	overcome.	Although	this	
conceptualisation	can	be	analytically	productive	and	help	scholars	to	understand,	for	example,	
how	principal-induced	reforms	are	received	and	mediated	by	resilient	organisational	cultures	
(Barnett	 and	 Coleman	 2005;	 Nielson	 et	 al.	 2006),	 it	 also	 comes	 with	 limitations.	 First,	 by	
reifying	 the	 PA-divide	 scholars	 neglect	 the	more	 subtle	 dynamics	 through	which	 agents	 and	
principals	mutually	influence	each	other.	Therefore,	recent	contributions	have	highlighted	the	
dynamic	 feedback	 processes	 through	 which	 bureaucrats	 shape	 principals’	 perceptions	 and	
preferences,	rather	than	regarding	these	preferences	as	fixed	and	strictly	separate	(Moschella	
2009;	 Broome	 2010;	 Clegg	 2010).	 Secondly,	 the	 dichotomy	 between	 principals	 and	 agents	
overstates	organisational	unity	while	obscuring	contradictions	and	conflicts	inside	and	outside	
IOs.	 International	 organisations	 are	 not	 coherent	 and	 integrated	 wholes,	 but	 made	 up	 of	
different	 units	 with	 distinct	 purposes.	 Likewise,	 the	 actors	 in	 their	 environments	 are	 not	
unified	but	place	complex	and	often	contradictory	demands	on	IOs.	As	Catherine	Weaver	has	
	argued,	incompatible	external	demands	are	often	mirrored	in	intra-bureaucratic	conflicts	and	
induce	 IOs	 to	engage	 in	contradictory,	 if	not	 ‘hypocritical’	behaviour	–	meaning	a	systematic	
gap	between	an	organisation’s	talk	and	actions	(Weaver	2008).		
Building	on	these	recent	moves	toward	overcoming	the	PA	divide,	this	article	conceptualises	IO	
agency	 as	driven	by	 trans-organisational	 coalitions.	 These	 coalitions	 are	products	of	 rational	
and	goal-oriented	exchanges,	but	located	beneath	the	aggregate	level,	i.e.	they	become	visible	
once	 ‘the’	principal	and	 ‘the’	agent	are	disaggregated.	Thus,	 ‘local’	here	means	 that	parts	of	
the	 organisation	 are	 to	 some	degree	 independent	 units	 of	 agency	 engaged	 in	 their	 distinct,	
local	exchanges,	and	drawing	on	distinct	sources	of	power.		
The	 local	orders	approach	 is	based	on	a	view	of	 international	organisations	as	rather	 loosely	
coupled	 ‘open	 systems,’	 the	 boundaries	 of	 which	 are	 porous	 enough	 to	 allow	 for	 multiple	
decentralised	 transactions	with	 the	organisational	environment	 (Ansell	and	Weber	1999:	75;	
see	 Koch	 2009;	 classically	 Scott	 2003).	 As	 organisations	 constantly	 need	 to	 acquire	material	
and	 ideational	 resources	 from	 their	 environment	 in	 order	 to	 survive,	 such	 cross-boundary	
exchanges	are	vital	 for	 their	 reproduction	 (Pfeffer	and	Salancik	2003).	Organisations	have	 to	
tap	 material	 (financial)	 support,	 mobilise	 individuals	 and	 collective	 actors	 to	 participate	 in	
organisational	 activities,	 and	also	depend	on	 social	 recognition	and	 legitimation.	 This	means	
that	the	organisational	boundary	 is	not	a	rigid	border	between	external	and	 internal	agency,	
but	a	central	site	of	organisational	activity.		
Zooming	in	on	boundary	activities	implies	that	container	view	of	IOs	is	given	up	in	favour	of	a	
disaggregated	view	of	cross-boundary	exchanges.	Since	relationships	with	the	environment	are	
entertained	at	all	levels	of	organisational	activity,	‘the’	IO	environment	is	not	encountered	as	a	
monolithic	 force	 that	 constrains	 and	 ‘selects’	 certain	 IO	 behaviours,	 but	 as	 a	 composite	 of	
actors	 and	demands	 that	 interact	with	 specific	parts	of	 the	 IO.vi	 For	example,	 the	allies	of	 a	
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research	 department	 differ	 from	 the	 allies	 of	 the	 communications	 unit,	 and	 they	may	place	
different	 demands	 on	 their	 organiszational	 counterparts.	 While	 scientists	 and	 research	
institutions	will	demand	scientific	rigor	and	precision,	media	representatives	will	ask	for	clear	
messages,	also	at	the	cost	of	simplification.	The	coupling	of	such	trans-organisational	coalitions	
with	 global	 (often	 vaguely	 stated)	 organisational	 goals	will	 often	be	 reasonably	 loose	 rather	
than	firmly	integrated	(Selznick	1996:	275).		
If	trans-organisational	coalitions	matter,	then	the	organisational	outcomes	resulting	from	their	
local	transactions	may	not	be	easily	predicted	from	a	corporate	perspective.	Especially	where	
different	 coalitions	 pursue	 conflicting	 goals,	 their	 activities	 are	 not	 easily	 integrated	 into	
corporate	 ‘actions’,	 but	 combine	 in	 nonlinear	 ways	 to	 produce	 organisational	 ‘resultants’	
(Allison	1971:	6;	see	Mayntz	2009:	140-145).vii 	Evidently,	this	leads	to	a	more	complex	account	
of	organisational	behaviour	than	the	actor	analogy	that	has	long	underpinned	IO	research,	and	
thus	involves	a	sacrifice	in	theoretical	parsimony.	Adding	such	complexity	may	not	always	be	
necessary.	Under	many	circumstances	and	for	many	research	purposes,	it	may	be	analytically	
more	productive	to	take	a	corporate	perspective	and	assume	that	intra-organisational	conflicts	
cancel	 out	 or	 can	 be	 centrally	 contained.	 Following	 this	 assumption	 one	may	 simply	 expect	
that	 overall,	 ‘systemic’	 conditions	 such	 as	 the	 preference	 constellations	 and	 power	
relationships	among	member	states	linearly	translate	into	organisational	outcomes.	However,	
in	IO	contexts,	less	‘efficient’	organisational	histories	(see	March	and	Olsen	1998)	are	likely	for	
at	least	two	reasons:	the	pervasiveness	of	collective	action	problems	in	IOs	and	the	fact	that	in	
many	 IOs,	 systemic	 power	 constellations	 and	 formal	 organisational	 power	 relationships	
strongly	diverge.				
First,	IOs	are	peculiar	organisations	because	they	are	jointly	governed	by	their	member	states.	
Hence,	 collective	action	problems	 loom	 large	 in	 interstate	organisations	where	a	plurality	of	
	principals	 has	 to	 agree	 before	 authoritative	 decisions	 are	made	 (Nielson	 and	 Tierney	 2003).	
While	 for	PA	scholars	 this	generally	means	 that	change	can	either	be	principal-driven	where	
‘common	agency’	 problems	 among	principals	 are	 resolved,	 or	 agent-driven	where	principals	
are	 divided	 on	 important	 issues	 (Copelovitch	 2010),	 it	 is	 equally	 possible	 that	 sub-coalitions	
between	certain	principals	and	certain	IO	subunits	are	forged.	Their	bargains	are	not	centrally	
negotiated,	but	locally	enacted.	
Such	sub-coalitions	need	not	 reflect	overall	power	 relationships	among	member	 states	 for	a	
second	 reason,	 namely	 the	 divergence	 of	 formal	 and	material	 powers	 in	 IOs.	 This	 aspect	 is	
mostly	 neglected	 in	 principal-agent	 approaches	which	 start	 from	 a	 ‘strictly	 formal	 notion	 of	
power’	 (Nielson	 and	 Tierney	 2003:	 251).	 They	 thereby	 assume	 that	 the	 central	 channel	 of	
member	states’	influence	on	IOs	is	their	formal	authority	as	principals.	From	that	perspective,	
the	 preference	 constellation	 among	 major	 principals	 is	 indeed	 the	 most	 important	 and	
systematic	predictor	for	IO	behaviour	(see	Copelovitch	2010).	However,	it	is	not	by	coincidence	
that	 PA	 analyses	 are	 mostly	 applied	 to	 the	 Bretton	 Woods	 institutions,	 where	 indeed	
materially	 powerful	 members	 are	 also	 formally	 privileged	 through	 the	 system	 of	 weighted	
voting.	 Yet,	 in	 other	 IOs	 –	 most	 prominently	 the	 United	 Nations	 organisations	 that	 have	
adopted	the	‘one	state,	one	vote’	principle	–,	organisational	and	external	power	relationships	
squarely	diverge.	As	a	result,	some	member	states	(or	member	state	subgroups)	may	be	in	a	
position	 to	 block	 organisational	 decisions	 even	 though	 the	materially	 most	 powerful	 states	
would	favour	such	decisions.	Translated	into	IO	subunits,	this	means	that	subunits	allied	with	
externally	 powerful	 member	 states	 (or	 private	 donors)	 may	 have	 better	 access	 to	 material	
power,	while	subunits	allied	with	member	states	occupying	critical	veto	points	may	dispose	of	
superior	formal	power.	The	confrontation	of	such	coalitions	may	hardly	be	centrally	resolved.	
A	 striking	 case	 where	 such	 a	 constellation	 has	 produced	 an	 outcome	 that	 is	 difficult	 to	
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rationalise	 from	a	 corporate	perspective	 is	GPA’s	 ‘mission	 shrink.’	 This	 case	will	 be	analysed	
through	the	open	systems	lens	in	the	following	section.	
	
	
Shifting	coalitions	and	the	politics	of	GPA	
The	World	 Health	 Organization,	 one	 of	 the	 specialised	 agencies	 of	 the	 United	 Nations,	 was	
founded	as	 ‘the	directing	and	co-ordinating	authority	on	 international	health	work,’	with	the	
‘attainment	 by	 all	 peoples	 of	 the	 highest	 possible	 level	 of	 health’	 (WHO	 2006:	 2)	 as	 its	
ambitious	official	objective.	 It	was	established	 in	a	 functionalist	spirit,	as	a	 locus	of	 technical	
cooperation	 beyond	 the	 conflictual	 world	 of	 power	 politics	 (Siddiqi	 1995),viii	 and	 is	 staffed	
mainly	with	medical	professionals	(Lee	2009:	27).	Not	being	part	of	the	‘usual	suspects’	(Haftel	
and	 Thompson	 2006:	 254)	 that	 IO	 studies	 are	 generally	 concerned	 with,	 WHO	 has	 lately	
appeared	on	the	scholarly	radar	mainly	due	to	its	reinforced	role	 in	the	combat	of	 infectious	
disease	(Zacher	and	Keefe	2008).	Recent	IO	scholarship	has	developed	an	interest	 in	WHO	in	
the	 face	of	apparent	 instances	of	 ‘slack’	 in	 the	organisation	such	as	 the	 travel	warnings	 that	
the	secretariat	issued	during	the	2003	SARS	crisis	(Cortell	and	Peterson	2006).	Its	potential	for	
slack	is	attributed	to	WHO’s	strong	identity	that	is	based	on	its	professional	values	and	medical	
ethos	(ibid:	266-271).	Thus	by	 juxtaposing	WHO	to	an	environment	of	member	states	whose	
demands	can	also	collide	with	organisational	values,	scholars	have	sought	to	reconstruct	the	
‘strategic	response’	of	an	organisation	that	for	this	purpose	is	conceptualised	as	an	intentional	
actor	(Chorev	2012).		
The	 following	 analysis	 of	 the	 GPA	 case,	 by	 contrast,	 starts	 from	 the	 observation	 of	WHO’s	
internal	complexity	and	conflict	rather	than	ascribing	it	corporate	agency.	I	will	point	out	that	
political	 coalitions	 and	 conflicts	 cut	 across	 the	 principal-agent	 divide,	 and	 show	 that	 the	
	shifting	constellation	of	these	coalitions	chiefly	determined	WHO’s	erratic	behaviour	regarding	
its	HIV/AIDS	programme.	In	order	to	grasp	these	dynamics,	some	background	information	on	
WHO’s	governance	structure	is	needed.	
	
WHO’s	structural	set-up	
WHO	is	structured	as	a	multi-layered	political	system	(Jacobson	1973;	Burci	and	Vignes	2004).	
Ultimate	 authority	 over	 WHO	 decisions	 is	 with	 member	 states.	 Decisions	 concerning	 the	
organisation’s	 policy	 and	 budget	 are	 taken	 in	 the	 World	 Health	 Assembly	 (WHA),	 WHO’s	
annual	member	 state	 forum,	according	 to	 the	 ‘one	 state,	one	vote’	principle.	The	WHA	also	
appoints	 the	 director-general,	 the	 head	 of	 WHO’s	 secretariat	 and	 central	 policy	 initiator	
(Jacobson	1973:	191).ix		
The	secretariat	has	a	global	and	a	regional	component.	It	is	divided	into	a	global	office	headed	
by	the	director-general,	and	six	regional	offices	headed	by	regional	directors.	In	addition,	WHO	
maintains	country	presence	 in	more	 than	140	country	offices.x	 The	six	 regional	directors	are	
not	appointed	by	the	director-general.	They	are	elected	by	the	regional	committees	composed	
of	 regional	 member	 states	 and	 thus	 quasi-independent	 from	 the	 central	 administration.	 As	
regional	 offices	 enjoy	 near	 budgetary	 autonomy	 and	 the	 prerogative	 over	 personnel	
administration	 (Beigbeder	 1997:	 56-60),	 they	 are	 effective	 vetoers	 without	 whose	 consent	
WHO	policies	cannot	be	implemented	(Godlee	1994:	1567;	Henderson,	2009:	85-86;	Peabody,	
1995:	734).	Hence,	 to	 run	a	 truly	 ‘global’	programme,	 the	 central	WHO	administration	must	
either	make	sure	of	regional	support	–	or	sidestep	the	regions.	
	
‘Special,’	even	‘global’:	WHO’s	early	response	to	AIDS	
In	 early	 1987,	WHO’s	 HIV/AIDS	 activities	were	 scaled	 up	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 disease’s	 global	
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spread.	With	 the	 help	 of	 extrabudgetary	 contributions,	 a	 ‘Special	 Programme	 on	 AIDS’	 was	
established	 that	 was	 put	 under	 the	 direct	 authority	 of	 the	 director-general.	 Its	 status	 as	 a	
special	 programme	 ensured	 that	 SPA/GPA	was	 governed	 from	 headquarters	 and	was	much	
less	 reliant	 on	 the	 financial	 and	 communication	 channels	 of	 the	 regional	 offices	 than	
conventional	programmes	(see	also	Godlee	1995b).	Its	structure	was	supposed	to	facilitate	an	
emergency	 response	 to	 the	 HIV/AIDS	 crisis	 and	 bypass	 opposition	 from	 countries	 that,	 for	
ideological	 or	 political	 reasons,	 were	 still	 refusing	 to	 accept	 the	 challenge	 of	 dealing	 with	
HIV/AIDS	(see	Knight	2008:	10,	14).	However,	it	soon	became	clear	that	AIDS	was	not	a	passing	
phenomenon	 or	 temporary	 outbreak	 that	 would	 soon	 be	 under	 control.	 Instead,	 it	 would	
remain	an	eminent	and	growing	health	concern	for	many	years.	By	renaming	the	programme	
‘Global	Programme	on	AIDS’	in	1988,	its	exceptionalism	was	put	on	a	regular	basis	(Soni	1998:	
28-32).		
GPA	 was	 thereby	 a	 privileged	 and	 much	 envied	 programme	 in	 WHO	 (Garrett	 1995:	 462).	
Jonathan	Mann,	who	had	been	hired	in	1986	and	become	head	of	GPA,	enjoyed	the	support	of	
and	 direct	 access	 to	 director-general	 Halfdan	Mahler	 and	 enormous	 popularity	with	 donors	
and	the	media.	Between	1987	and	1990,	contributions	tripled	and	GPA	grew	into	the	 largest	
single	programme	in	WHO’s	history	(Merson	et	al.	2008:	480-481).	Its	external	allies	included	
not	only	donors,	but	also	other	international	organisations	and	civil	society	actors.	Through	the	
so-called	 ‘WHO-UNDP	Alliance’	 for	HIV/AIDS,	GPA	could	provide	direct	 financial	assistance	at	
the	country	level,	so	that	its	operative	strength	far	exceeded	common	WHO	programmes	(Chin	
2007:	201).	
However,	GPA’s	activities	were	not	only	welcomed	by	WHO’s	staff	and	principals.	In	addition	
to	 the	 constant	 jealousy	 of	 programmes	 dedicated	 to	 less	 ‘fashionable’	 problems	 (Gibbons	
1990:	 1306),	 GPA	 faced	 harsh	 regional	 opposition.	 In	 particular	 in	 the	 African	 region	many	
	governments	 feared	 stigmatisation	 and	 denied	 the	 problem	 of	 AIDS,	 thus	 also	 opposing	
western	 AIDS	 policies	 (Iliffe	 2006;	 Knight	 2008:	 10,	 14).	 To	 sidestep	 such	 opposition,	 GPA	
avoided	common	staffing	procedures	and	appointed	people	centrally	instead	of	working	with	
personnel	 provided	 by	 the	 regional	 office.	 Regional	 directors	 were	 also	 upset	 that	 the	
programme’s	 finances	were	operated	quasi	 independently	 from	the	 regional	offices.	Though	
provoking	 regional	 resistance,	 these	 extra-ordinary	 methods	 were	 protected	 by	 the	
unswerving	support	of	the	director-general	(Chin	2007:	200-201).	
	
Coalition	shift	and	GPA	contraction	
The	conditions	for	GPA	changed	significantly	after	1988,	when	Halfdan	Mahler	was	succeeded	
by	 Hiroshi	 Nakajima	 as	 director-general.	 Contrary	 to	 Mahler’s	 unanimous	 support	 base,	
Nakajima’s	 winning	 coalition	was	much	 smaller	 so	 that	 he	 took	 three	 ballots	 to	 be	 elected	
(Chetley	 1988).	 His	 supporters	 came	mainly	 from	 developing	 countries	 and	 did	 not	 include	
major	 western	 powers	 such	 as	 the	 United	 States.	 The	 US	 was	 firmly	 behind	 GPA	 but	 had	
favoured	 the	 Brazilian	 candidate	 Carlyle	 Guerra	 de	 Macedo	 for	 the	 director-general’s	 post	
(Chorev	2012:	156).	His	thin	majority	made	Nakajima	much	more	dependent	on	the	regional	
directors	 who	 are	 crucial	 for	 mobilising	 votes	 in	 an	 organisation	 marked	 by	 regional	 block	
voting	(Siddiqi	1995:	77-82;	and	see	Chin	2007:	202).		
This	 greater	 dependence	 on	 regional	 directors’	 support,	 together	 with	 his	 preference	 for	
technical	rather	than	social	or	political	approaches	to	public	health,	contributed	to	Nakajima’s	
highly	sceptical	view	of	GPA	(Soni	1998:	90-92).	In	addition,	Mann’s	popularity	and	‘rising	star	
status’	 (Chin	 2007:	 201)	 fuelled	 personal	 rivalry,	 given	 that	Nakajima	 himself	 had	 extremely	
bad	press	and	was	publicly	accused	of	being	inarticulate	and	lacking	leadership	skills	(see,	for	
example,	 Godlee	 1995a).	 Hence,	 collaboration	 between	Mann	 and	 Nakajima	was	 extremely	
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conflict-laden.	They	relied	on	different	external	allies	–	western	donors	on	the	one	hand	versus	
developing	 countries	 and	 their	 regional	 directors	 on	 the	 other	 –	 with	 different	 preferences	
regarding	GPA.		
In	this	constellation,	Nakajima	could	draw	on	his	formal	authority	as	director-general	to	curb	
GPA’s	 role	 in	 WHO.	 Making	 use	 of	 this	 organisational	 veto	 position,	 Nakajima	 greatly	
downsized	 the	 programme	 and	 restricted	 collaboration	 with	 civil	 society	 actors	 (Soni	 1998:	
92).	 In	 line	with	demands	 from	regional	offices,	he	circumscribed	GPA’s	operative	autonomy	
and	 realigned	 it	 with	 WHO’s	 general	 bureaucratic	 procedures,	 thereby	 reinforcing	 regional	
control.	 Drawing	 on	 his	 administrative	 authority,	 Nakajima	mounted	 additional	 bureaucratic	
obstacles	 such	 as	 protracted	 and	 withheld	 travel	 authorisations	 that	 constrained	 Mann’s	
leeway	in	directing	GPA	(Chin	2007:	202).	Faced	with	these	growing	bureaucratic	impediments,	
Mann	 resigned	 from	 WHO	 ‘in	 protest	 and	 frustration’	 (Leaning	 1998)	 and	 moved	 to	 the	
Harvard	School	of	Public	Health	in	1990.	Nakajima	appointed	Michael	Merson,	an	‘experienced	
UN	 bureaucrat’	 (Knight	 2008:	 18),	 as	Mann’s	 successor.	 Subsequently,	 the	 programme	was	
operatively	‘normalised’	and	its	mandate	reinterpreted	as	requiring	technical	rather	than	more	
intrusive	political	and	social	activities	(Soni	1998:	93-94).		
For	 GPA	 and	 WHO’s	 position	 in	 HIV/AIDS	 governance	 more	 generally,	 this	 shift	 meant	 a	
significant	 retreat.	Mann’s	departure	was	 followed	by	an	 immediate	decline	 in	contributions	
(Knight	2008:	18),	and	many	of	Mann’s	previous	colleagues	were	moved	to	other	programmes	
or	 voluntarily	 left	GPA	 (Soni	1998:	95).	Having	 lost	 their	 internal	 ally,	 external	 supporters	of	
GPA	started	to	look	for	alternatives	in	the	1990s	(Slutkin	2000:	S30).	This	coalition	shift,	though	
certainly	 not	 the	 only	 cause	 of	 UNAIDS’s	 creation	 by	 1996,xi	 strongly	 contributed	 to	WHO’s	
marginalisation	 in	 the	 subsequent	 institutional	 reshuffling.	 As	 other	 UN	 agencies	 were	
doubting	WHO’s	 leadership	 role	 in	HIV/AIDS	and	called	 for	more	 inter-sectoral	coordination,	
	the	way	was	 paved	 for	 the	 creation	 of	UNAIDS.	Unsurprisingly,	WHO’s	 bid	 for	 leadership	 in	
UNAIDS	 went	 unheard.	 The	 birth	 of	 UNAIDS	 (1995-6)	 meant	 the	 end	 of	 WHO’s	 HIV/AIDS	
programme,	which	was	a	‘significant	blow	to	the	organisation’s	leadership	over	a	global	health	
issue	that	should	have	been	a	clear	case	for	it	to	assert	its	mandate’	(Lee,	2009:	62).	
Locally,	however,	Nakajima’s	reining	in	of	GPA	proved	to	be	a	successful	strategy,	as	he	was	re-
elected	 director-general	 in	 1993	 despite	 massive	 western	 opposition	 (Economist	 1995:	 84).	
Over	 his	 first	 five	 years	 in	 office,	 most	 western	 governments	 had	 turned	 their	 back	 on	
Nakajima	and	were	highly	 critical	of	what	 they	 regarded	as	an	autocratic	management	 style	
and	 poor	 communication	 skills	 (Chorev	 2012:	 157).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Japanese	 government	
insisted	 on	 having	 one	 of	 their	 own	 at	 the	 top	 of	 one	 of	 the	 UN’s	 big	 specialised	 agencies	
(Godlee	1993a),	and	effectively	lobbied	for	what	became	‘the	narrowest	victory	in	the	history	
of	the	United	Nations’	(Godlee	1993b).	The	vote	was	followed	by	furious	charges	of	fraud	and	
corruption,	 as	 Nakajima’s	 opponents	 accused	 the	 Japanese	 government	 of	 having	 bought	
developing	country	votes	(Chorev	2012:	157;	Lee	2009:	83).xii	Still,	Nakajima’s	opponents	had	
to	accept	that	he	had	been	able	to	forge	another	winning	coalition	in	WHO.	They	could	at	best	
shift	their	support	to	bilateral	programmes	or	other	organisations	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	
myriad	public-private	governance	arrangements	 that	began	to	dominate	 international	health	
work	in	the	1990s	(Lee	2009:	99;	Chorev	2012:	156-157).	Hence,	GPA’s	(and	WHO’s)	decline	in	
the	1990s	were	only	one	side	of	a	coin,	the	other	being	Nakajima’s	re-election.	Only	after	his	
second	term	 in	office	did	Nakajima	decide	not	 to	run	 for	a	 third	term	 in	 the	 interests	of	 the	
organisation	(Lee	2009:	84).xiii		
	
	
Implications:	IO	change	and	types	of	trans-organisational	coalitions	
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The	history	of	WHO’s	HIV/AIDS	programme	illustrates	how	local	coalitions	can	get	involved	in	
conflicts	that	are	self-undermining	from	a	corporate	perspective.	This	analysis	shall	not	imply,	
however,	 that	 ‘mission	 shrink’	 is	 the	 sole	 possible	 outcome	 of	 trans-organisational	 coalition	
building.	 Rather,	 the	 causal	 tendencies	 inherent	 in	 local	 coalitions	 depend	 on	 the	 kind	 of	
powers	 controlled	 by	 external	 and	 internal	 players.	 To	 specify	 the	 ‘local	 orders’	 claim	 and	
sketch	 an	 avenue	 for	 further	 research,	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 article	 suggests	 a	 broader	
framework	 for	 analysing	 local	 drivers	 of	 IO	 change	 that	 is	 based	 on	 insights	 from	 the	WHO	
case.	 I	 will	 do	 so	 by	 pointing	 out,	 first,	 the	 growing	 importance	 of	 trans-organisational	
coalitions	in	WHO,	and	secondly,	by	proposing	a	heuristic	of	trans-organisational	coalitions	and	
the	types	of	IO	change	associated	with	them.		
The	history	of	GPA	is	by	far	not	the	only	case	of	conflicting	coalitions	 inside	WHO.	Quite	the	
contrary,	 in	 the	 face	of	 its	 limited	 ‘governability’,	WHO’s	donor	 states	 (and	 increasingly	 also	
private	 donors)xiv	 now	 centrally	 rely	 on	 so-called	 extrabudgetary	 contributions	 to	 use	 the	
organisation	for	their	purposes.	As	regular	assessed	contributions	to	WHO’s	budget	have	been	
frozen	and	then	even	shrunk	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	(Lee	2009:	39),	these	additional	payments	
are	now	making	up	the	main	share	of	WHO’s	budget.	Thus,	whereas	extrabudgetary	donations	
only	accounted	for	20	per	cent	of	WHO’s	overall	budget	in	1970	(Lee	2009:	39),	they	have	risen	
ever	since,	approaching	80	per	cent	by	2010	(WHO	2010).	Yet	unlike	in	the	GPA	case,	donors	
now	 work	 preferably	 through	 short-term	 donations	 that	 are	 ‘earmarked’,	 i.e.	 specified	 for	
particular	 tasks	 (Kickbusch	 et	 al.	 2010:	 558).	 The	 result	 is	 a	 sustained	 mismatch	 between	
official	priorities,	agreed	by	the	governing	bodies,	and	WHO’s	actual	activities	(WHO	2010:	6),	
as	 ‘[e]ven	projects	 authorised	by	World	Health	Assembly	 (WHA)	 resolutions	are	 reliant	on	a	
chase	for	funding’	(People’s	Health	Movement	et	al.	2008:	228).	
This	budgetary	mismatch	is	often	criticised	for	being	dysfunctional	and	unsustainable	as	it	does	
	not	allow	 the	organisation	 to	engage	 in	 long-term	planning	and	also	undermines	 the	official	
policy	 of	 results-based	 (rather	 than	 resource-based)	 budgeting	 (WHO	 2010).xv	 However,	 the	
incentives	resulting	from	this	budgetary	trend	are	not	uniform	across	the	organisation.	While	
WHO’s	 central	management	 has	 an	 interest	 in	more	 flexible,	 unspecified	 funds	 that	 can	 be	
more	 freely	 allocated	 (WHO	 2008:	 12-13),	 earmarking	 allows	 those	 individual	 programmes	
that	are	successful	fundraisers	to	negotiate	their	own	terms	with	donors	instead	of	submitting	
their	income	to	centralised	oversight.		
The	 overall	 trend	 resulting	 from	 this	 fragmented	 state	 of	 affairs	 has	 been	 labelled	
‘underfunded	 ‘mission	 creep’’	 (Levine	 2006:	 1015).	 In	 official	 documents	 issued	 by	 the	
secretariat,	the	organisation	is	described	as	‘not	functioning’	and	‘overextended’	(WHO	2011),	
thus	 underlining	 diagnoses	 of	 subunit	 mission	 creep.	 Hence,	 the	 rhetoric	 and	 aspiration	 of	
corporate	 strategy	 and	 comparative	 advantage	 (e.g.	 Andresen	 2002;	 Chan	 2006)	 are	
systematically	 undermined	 by	 the	 local	 coalitions	 that	 pursue	 their	 projects	 irrespective	 of	
overall	priorities	–	and	by	the	fact	the	WHO’s	subunits	have	long	become	rivalling	fundraisers	
rather	than	parts	of	a	more	integrated	whole	(Lee	2009:	106;	People’s	Health	Movement	et	al.	
2008).			
These	 observations	 from	 WHO	 suggest	 that	 trans-organisational	 coalitions	 can	 affect	 IO	
change	differently	depending	on	the	resources	controlled	by	their	external	and	internal	allies	
(see	 table	 1	 below).	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 external	 allies	 (mainly	 member	 states)	 can	 be	
differentiated	 according	 to	 their	 relative	 material	 power,	 i.e.	 the	 financial,	 manpower	 etc.	
resources	they	have	to	offer	to	the	organisation.	They	thus	may	be	broadly	divided	into	donors	
and	recipients.	Internal	organisational	allies,	by	contrast,	can	be	divided	into	those	that	occupy	
veto	positions	regarding	collective	decisions	and	those	that	don’t.	Obviously,	these	are	rough	
categories	that	can	only	provide	a	first	step	toward	a	full	explanatory	typology	(cf.	George	and	
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Bennett	 2005:	 233-262).	 They	 are	 neither	 logically	 exhaustive	 nor	 do	 they	 grasp	 the	 full	
empirical	 variance	 to	 be	 found	 in	 intra-organisational	 constellations	 (see	 also	 Bendor	 and	
Hammond	 1992).	 Still,	 they	 point	 to	 clearly	 distinguishable	 combinations	 of	 allies	 that	 have	
different	 capacities	 for	 affecting	 IO	 change	 –	 in	 directions	 that	 transcend	 the	 common	
‘principal	control	versus	agency	slack’	dichotomy.	
	
Table	1	Trans-organisational	coalitions	and	their	impact	on	IO	change	
	
	
Formal	control		
(organisational	veto	players)	
No	formal	control		
(no	organisational	veto)	
Superior	 material	
resources	(‘donor	state’)	
principal-induced	reform	 subunit	mission	creep	
inferior	material	 resources	
(‘recipient	state’)	
mission	shrink	 no	or	marginal	effect	
	
	
First,	 alliances	 between	 those	 commanding	 superior	material	 power	 resources	with	 internal	
vetoers	 (upper	 left	 cell)	 are	 constellations	 where	 the	 IO	 is	 coherently	 governed	 by	 an	
influential	 set	of	principals.	This	 is	 the	classic	principal-agent	constellation	where	 formal	and	
material	power	do	not	significantly	diverge	(Nielson	and	Tierney	2003)	and	IO	change	hinges	
upon	 common	 agency	 among	 the	 major	 principals	 (Copelovitch	 2010).	 Second,	 alliances	
between	recipients	and	internal	vetoers	(lower	left	cell)	are	better	equipped	to	block	policies	
than	 to	 create	 new	 programmes,	 given	 that	 they	 lack	 material	 support.	 These	 are	
constellations	 that	 can	 lead	 to	 ‘mission	 shrink’	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 GPA.	 Thirdly,	 if	 external	
recipients	are	only	allied	with	organisational	players	 that	 cannot	exert	 formal	 control	 (lower	
right	 cell),	 the	 influence	 of	 these	 alliances	 tends	 to	 be	 rather	 marginal.	 Finally,	 alliances	
	between	 donors	 and	 organisational	 units	 that	 do	 not	 occupy	 the	 central	 veto	 positions	 can	
hardly	 induce	overall	 reforms,	but	may	decentrally	create	new	programmes	unless	these	are	
vetoed	by	others	(upper	right	cell).	This	is	the	constellation	of	fragmented	mission	creep	that	
currently	dominates	WHO’s	structural	evolution.		
As	noted	above,	these	are	ceteris	paribus	organisational	tendencies,	the	realisation	of	which	is	
not	 deterministic	 but	 depends	 on	 a	 multitude	 of	 contextual	 factors.	 Still,	 ordering	 trans-
organisational	 politics	 in	 terms	 of	 material	 resources	 and	 organisational	 veto	 positions	 is	 a	
useful	heuristic	for	specifying	how	trans-organisational	dynamics	can	influence	IO	change,	both	
positively	and	negatively.	Still,	this	is	not	a	catch-all	heuristic	in	that	it	focuses	on	material	and	
formal	 (but	not	 ideational)	 sources	of	power	and	 thus	 takes	a	deliberately	 rationalist	 stance	
vis-à-vis	 IO	 change.	 Such	 an	 approach	 also	 resonates	 with	 recent	 attempts	 by	 historical	
institutionalists	 to	 categorise	 modes	 of	 institutional	 change	 in	 terms	 of	 actor	 and	 rule	
characteristics	(see	Mahoney	and	Thelen	2010,	esp.	18-22)	and	thus	takes	up	the	challenge	of	
bringing	research	on	IO	change	and	research	on	the	state	closer	together	(Barnett	2002).xvi	This	
promises	to	be	a	fruitful	starting	point	for	theorising	local	orders	in	international	organisations	
beyond	the	WHO	case.	
	
	
Conclusion	
Fragmentation	 and	 competition	 for	 funding	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 global	 health	 governance	 are	
increasingly	 blamed	 for	 undermining	 collective	 action	 and	 sustainable	 policy-making	 (e.g.	
Cohen	2006;	Kickbusch	et	al.	2010;	Lee	2010).	As	this	paper	has	shown,	fragmentation	not	only	
undermines	 coordination	 between	 organisations,	 but	 also	 coherent	 action	 by	 individual	
organisations.	 Starting	 from	 the	 puzzle	 the	 GPA’s	 ‘mission	 shrink’	 poses	 for	 established	
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explanations	of	 IO	 change,	 I	 have	proposed	an	alternative	 conceptualisation	of	 international	
organisations	 –	 not	 as	 actors,	 but	 as	 ‘open	 systems’	 that	 transact	 with	 their	 environments	
through	multiple	and	decentralised	organisational	channels.	This	turn	to	agency	at	rather	than	
within	 IO	 boundaries	 brings	 to	 the	 fore	 the	 trans-organisational	 coalitions	 that	 are	 forged	
between	organisational	units	and	supporters	in	the	IO	environment.	These	coalitions	establish	
their	own	local	orders	and	may	control	different	sources	of	power,	both	formal	and	material.	
Thus,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 local	 coalitions	 are	most	 likely	 to	make	 a	 difference	 for	 IO	 change	
where	 states’	 formal	 and	 material	 power	 resources	 do	 not	 coincide,	 which	 makes	 them	
dependent	on	alliances	with	power	holders	within	 the	organisation.	The	GPA	case	 illustrates	
these	 claims	 as	 it	 was	 a	 major	 coalitional	 shift	 that	 caused	 the	 programme’s	 surprising	
contraction.	
Beyond	 solving	 the	 GPA	 puzzle,	 I	 have	 used	 this	 and	 further	 observations	 from	 WHO	 to	
systematise	 the	 local	 orders	 approach	 to	 IO	 change	 and	 distinguished	 trans-organisational	
coalitions	 according	 to	 the	 veto	 power	 and	 material	 resources	 controlled	 by	 them.	 I	 have	
argued	that	these	types	of	coalitions	tend	to	be	 linked	with	different	types	of	 IO	agency	and	
change.	Obviously,	 this	 rough	 typology	needs	 to	be	 specified	and	 refined	 in	 future	 research.	
Organisational	 interest	 constellations	 and	 decision	 rules	 vary	 across	 contexts,	 and	 thus	 can	
spur	 quite	 different	 dynamics	 of	 organisational	 change.	 Thus	 the	 categories	 offered	 in	 this	
heuristic	can	serve	as	a	 starting	point,	but	certainly	not	 the	endpoint	of	 research	 into	 trans-
organisational	coalitions.	In	particular,	the	question	of	reform	and	endogenous	change	has	to	
be	addressed	 in	 future	 research.	Material	power	and	organisational	veto	may	be	empirically	
distinguishable,	 but	 can	 still	 be	 causally	 interrelated,	 as	 when	 powerful	 states	 manage	 to	
reform	IO	decision	rules	in	their	favour.	The	reform	history	of	international	organisations	such	
as	the	United	Nations	suggests	that	this	is	not	a	typical	development	and	that	formal	privileges	
	can	easily	be	protected	against	powerful	challengers	(see	Hosli	et	al.	2011).	Yet,	the	question	
remains	 whether	 formal	 control	 and	material	 resources	 interact	 to	 reinforce	 or	 undermine	
each	 other.	 Research	 along	 these	 lines	 can	 enhance	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 drivers	 of	 IO	
change	beyond	 the	principal-agent	dichotomy,	 the	 analytical	 fruitfulness	of	which	has	 come	
under	increasing	attack	in	recent	years.		
Finally,	disaggregating	IOs	into	trans-organisational	coalitions	also	opens	avenues	for	applying	
new	methodological	 tools	 to	 IO	 research.	 In	 particular,	 inter-organisation	 relationships	 and	
coalitional	dynamics	can	be	grasped	with	quantitative	network	analysis	techniques,	which	have	
recently	 gained	 prominence	 in	 IR	 research	 (Hafner-Burton	 et	 al.	 2009).	 In	 IR	 scholarship,	
network	 analysis	 is	 mostly	 applied	 to	 investigate	 ties	 between	 nations	 (Maoz	 2011).	 But	 it	
could	 equally	 be	used	 to	map	 trans-organisational	 ties	 and	 explore	 the	nodes	 and	positions	
resulting	from	trans-organisational	networks.	This	would	allow	researchers	to	assess	whether	
formal,	 hierarchical	 ‘centrality’	 is	 reflected	 in	 various	 types	 of	 empirical	 centrality	 in	
organisations	 (cf.	Hafner-Burton	et	al.	 2009:	563-565).	 Such	 research	would	 require	detailed	
empirical	data	on	the	ties	between	organisational	actors,	but	may	well	pay	off	with	astonishing	
insights	into	the	actual	transactions	and	relationships	in	and	across	international	organisations.		
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i	 	Hence,	 ‘local’	 here	 is	 not	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 transient	 or	 ‘temporary’,	 or	 in	 a	 geographic	
sense,	 but	 as	 referring	 to	 the	 subunit	 level	 of	 organisations.	 Relevant	 subunits	 such	 as	 specific	
programmes	 or	 departments	 can	 also	 be	 geographically	 located,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 with	WHO’s	 regional	
offices,	 but	 the	 important	 aspect	 here	 is	 that	 they	 are	 endowed	 with	 a	 specific	 function	 (and	 thus	
capacities)	within	the	organisation	(see	Friedberg	1997:	125).	
ii	 	GPA’s	major	donors	were	the	US,	Sweden,	the	United	Kingdom,	Canada,	and	the	Netherlands	
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(Soni	1998:	61).	
iii	 	This	article	is	concerned	with	this	turning	point	in	WHO’s	behaviour,	not	with	the	plethora	of	
developments	that	ultimately	resulted	in	the	creation	and	specific	design	of	UNAIDS	(see	on	this	Jönsson	
1996;	Knight	2008;	Soni	1998).	
iv	 	UNAIDS,	 the	 Joint	United	Nations	 Programme	on	HIV/AIDS,	 is	 an	 umbrella	 organisation	 that	
initially	 comprised	 six	 UN	 organisations:	 WHO,	 UNICEF,	 UNDP,	 the	 United	 Nations	 Population	 Fund	
(UNFPA),	the	United	Nations	Educational,	Scientific,	and	Cultural	Organization	(UNESCO),	and	the	World	
Bank	(Knight,	2008:	30).	In	the	meantime,	it	has	been	joined	by	the	World	Food	Programme	(WFP),	the	
Office	of	 the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	 for	Refugees	 (UNHCR),	 the	United	Nations	Office	on	
Drugs	and	Crime	(UNODC),	and	the	International	Labour	Organization	(ILO).		
v	 	WHO	only	re-established	a	full-fledged	HIV/AIDS	department	in	2001	(Gerbase	et	al.	2009:	10).	
vi	 See	 also	 Broome	 and	 Seabrooke	 (2012)	 for	 an	 investigation	 of	 how	 IO	 units	 ‘read’	 the	 relevant	
organisational	environment.	
vii	 	This	focus	on	trans-organisational	coalitions	slightly	differs	from	open	systems	approaches	that	
are	 primarily	 concerned	 with	 ‘boundary	 spanners’,	 i.e.	 actors	 specialised	 in	 managing	 inter-
organisational	relations	(Ansell	and	Weber	1999:	92;	see	Jönsson	1986:	41).	For	example,	the	‘proximate	
principals’	that	Elsig	(2011)	has	identified	as	relevant	players	in	the	World	Trade	Organization	could	be	
considered	as	 such	boundary	 role	occupants.	By	contrast,	 the	coalitional	 view	emphasises	 that	actors	
need	not	be	specialised	in	‘external	relations’	to	be	part	of	trans-organisational	coalitions,	and	seeks	to	
integrate	the	roles	played	by	organisational	actors	and	their	external	allies.	
viii	 Note	 that	 the	 term	 ‘technical’	 is	 ambiguously	 used.	 In	 the	 IR	 literature	 on	 international	
organisation,	‘technical’	generally	means	the	opposite	of	‘political,’	while	in	WHO	terminology	‘technical	
assistance’	(helping	countries	to	carry	out	policy	recommendations)	is	opposed	to	‘normative	activities’	
(standards,	guidelines,	recommendations),	a	core	competency	of	WHO	(Lee	1998:	9-11).	
ix	 	In	 fact	 however,	 the	 director-general’s	 selection	 is	 made	 by	 the	 Executive	 Board	 that	 is	
composed	 of	 currently	 34	 individuals	 and	 usually	 meets	 twice	 a	 year.	 The	 Board	 prepares	 WHA	
decisions,	 monitors	 the	 work	 of	 the	 secretariat	 and	 nominates	 the	 director-general	 that	 is	 formally	
appointed	by	the	Assembly.	
x	 WHO	 is	 regionally	 subdivided	 into	a	Southeast	Asian,	a	Western	Pacific,	a	African,	an	Eastern	
Mediterranean,	an	American	and	a	European	region.	
xi	 Besides	the	recognition	that	HIV/AIDS	was	a	multisectoral	challenge,	which	had	also	guided	the	
work	of	GPA,	a	chief	motive	for	switching	to	UNAIDS	was	‘donor	fatigue’	(Chin	2007:	204).	UNAIDS	was	
not	 charged	 with	 direct	 assistance,	 but	 with	 co-ordination,	 thus	 reducing	 the	 overall	 cost	 of	 the	
international	HIV/AIDS	response	(Soni	1998:	65-69).	
xii	 	Although	 Nakajima’s	 1993	 re-election	 was	 certainly	 the	 most	 scandalised	 ballot	 in	 WHO’s	
history,	 allegations	 of	 intransparency	 and	 suspicions	 of	 horse	 trading	 regularly	 accompany	 director-
general	elections	in	WHO	(Horton	2006).	
xiii	 	WHO’s	 governing	 bodies	 had	 decided	 in	 1996	 that	 henceforth	 director-generals	 could	 only	
serve	for	two	terms,	a	rule	unprecedented	among	United	Nations	organisations.	Nakajima	as	the	current	
incumbent	 was	 exempted	 from	 this	 new	 rule,	 but,	 of	 course,	 the	 decision	 de-legitimated	 a	 bid	 for	
another	term	(Godlee	1996).		
xiv	 	In	 2006,	 the	 Bill	 and	 Melinda	 Gates	 Foundation	 was	 the	 third	 (equal	 with	 Japan)	 largest	
contributor	of	funding	to	the	WHO,	providing	voluntary	contributions	of	$	99,4	million	(People’s	Health	
Movement	et	al.	2008:	227).		
xv	 	In	 2006,	 due	 to	 the	 scarcity	 of	 core	 funds,	WHO	was	 permitted	 to	 allocate	 extrabudgetary	
donations	to	core	running	costs	(Lee	2009:	106),	yet	the	source	of	the	problem	remained	unaddressed.	
xvi	 	Mahoney’s	and	Thelen’s	 (2010)	approach	differs	 from	the	heuristic	suggested	 in	here	 in	 that	
the	 authors	 conceptualise	 institutions	 as	 rules,	 whereas	 this	 article	 focuses	 on	 organisations,	 i.e.	
institutions	with	actor-like	characteristics.	
